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A History of GATT Unfair Trade 
Remedy Law - Confusion of 
Purposes 
John J .  Barceld III 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper presents an analytical history of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
law in GATT and its member countries. In recent years this body of ‘unfair 
trade remedy’ law has flourished in the western trading system. Important 
trading countries have adopted new or expanded anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
laws and imposed trade-blocking remedies under them more frequently than 
ever before. I try to explain in this essay how and why these laws - which I 
view as protectionist - have prospered and become so rooted in GATT and its 
member countries. 
To understand the significance of unfair trade remedy law it helps to 
distinguish it from fair trade relief - known in GATT as ‘safeguard’ action and 
in the United States as ‘escape clause’ relief. Safeguard action, if taken, must be 
imposed against all imports of a particular kind, not just unfairly traded imports. 
Availability of safeguard relief turns on whether imports as a whole, from 
whatever country, are causing or threatening serious injury to domestic 
producers. Questions of pricing fairness or foreign subsidies do not arise. The 
relief - which may include increased tariffs, quantitative restrictions, or other 
trade bamers - must be temporary and the invoking country must compensate 
affected exporting countries (or such countries may retaliate).’ In the United 
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I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XIX, 61 Stat. 
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States the President has broad discretion to refuse to grant the remedy, even if 
executive agencies recommend it. 
Unfair trade relief, by contrast, applies selectively against only dumped or 
subsidised imports - on the theory that dumping and subsidisation are unfair 
practices. The remedy is an increased duty offsetting the margin of dumping or 
the amount of subsidy. It lasts as long as the targeted practices continue, and the 
exporting country has no claim to compensation. Most importantly, the 
triggering level of injury to domestic producers is lower than that needed for 
safeguard relief, and in the United States the President has no authority to block 
relief. 
United States’ lawyers representing domestic producers almost always prefer 
the unfair trade remedy laws to a safeguard proceeding. The same seems true in 
the European Community and other countries. An industry losing market share 
to imports simply has a better chance of effective relief under unfair trade 
remedy law. 
The popularity of unfair trade remedy laws with domestic producers seems to 
support this paper’s basic premise that these laws serve largely protectionist 
ends. Some students of the global economy assert, however, that dumping and 
subsidies are fundamentally ‘unfair’ practices. They seem to believe that these 
practices in themselves, or at least when they injure foreign producers, impair 
social welfare and undermine free trade goals. They claim that anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy laws actually advance the cause of free trade.* I have joined this 
debate elsewhere arguing for the opposite view - that anti-dumping and anti- 
subsidy laws, as currently enforced, clash with free trade goals (Barcelo 1979, 
pp. 53-93, 1982 and 1984; and Sikes, 1989, analysing countervailing duties as a 
form of anti-subsidy law). In this paper taking that position as a premise, I 
inquire into the antecedents, understandings, and assumptions that allowed these 
trade-restricting laws to grow and prosper in an evolving trade system that 
paradoxically stresses in other areas ever more complete removal of trade 
restrictions. 
2. GATT AND NATIONAL ANTI-DUMPING LAW 
a .  Analytical Framework: Unfairness and Predation 
This is not the place for an elaborate analysis of the coherence of anti- 
dumping policy, but a statement of this paper’s basic appraisal of the problem 
should aid understanding of its conclusions and historical analysis. Dumping 
See J. F. Beseler and A.N. Williams, Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Law: The Europeun 
Community vi (Preface) (1986) (assertion limited to anti-dumping law). 
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occurs when a private firm sells for export below its home market price, a form 
of price discrimination. As with anti-price-discrimination law in general, anti- 
dumping harmonises with basic antitrust policy only if enforcement is carefully 
tailored to restrain solely predatory pricing tactics. The theory of what one wants 
to oppose is easy to understand - underselling by a dominant rival to drive out 
all competitors so that the surviving firm, having ‘cornered the market,’ can 
raise prices to monopoly levels. The danger to the competitive process inherent 
in overzealous enforcement of anti-price discrimination policy is also easy to 
picture: firms afraid to engage in healthy price competition for fear of a lawsuit 
or criminal prosecution. 
The literature on price-discrimination in the United States has tried to capture 
these conflicting tendencies in the distinction between injury to competition 
and injury to competitors. If anti-price discrimination law is so bluntly enforced 
that price cutting is proscribed whenever it takes customers away from 
competitors (the injury to competitors test), then firms will always be wary of 
competing on price. Under an injury to competition standard, something more 
would be required. A complainant might have to show that the price cutting 
arose out of genuinely predatory motives - for example, that it involved below- 
marginal-cost prices (money-losing even in the short run) by a dominant 
firm in a concentrated industry. It is not the purpose of this paper to explore this 
distinction in any detail, but rather to capture the essence of it so that 
the equivalent dilemma in the enforcement of anti-dumping laws can be 
understood. 
In anti-dumping policy an injury-to-competitors standard is essentially 
indistinguishable from a safeguard test of injury. Countries apply safeguard 
remedies to favour domestic over foreign producers, not to protect the 
competitive process. Theoretically this is to give domestic producers a longer 
breathing space for adjustment to severe foreign competition - competition that 
is perfectly fair but that nevertheless causes serious injury to domestic 
producers. 
An anti-dumping policy aimed solely at predatory dumping would apply an 
‘injury-to-competition’ test of dumping injury, in line with antitrust goals. Thus, 
dumping ‘unfairness’ would refer to predatory actions threatening the 
competitive process itself. This author has never found anything else about 
international price discrimination that could logically be found unfair (Barcelo, 
1972 and 1979, pp. 53-54). 
Historically, however, as we will see later, GATT anti-dumping law has not 
acknowledged his basic distinction between injury-to-competition and injury-to- 
competitors. Instead it is a hybrid of antitrust and safeguard policies, awkwardly 
resting on a confused notion of ‘unfairness.’ Early commentators on dumping 
seemed automatically to associate the practice with predatory motives, but in 
modern application anti-dumping measures have almost exclusively burdened 
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nonpredatory dumping. There seems to be no recorded case of anti-dumping 
action taken against genuine predation. 
b. Pre-GATT History 
Canada enacted the first national anti-dumping law in 1904.3 That early law 
took the now classic form of assessing an additional anti-dumping duty equal to 
the amount of any price discrimination on imports. Although the desire to 
combat United States dumping of steel into Canada was a stated purpose (Viner, 
1923, p. 88; and Trendelenburg, 1927, p. 13), the law was apparently motivated 
more by the goal of finding an alternative to higher across-the-board tariff 
increases being forcefully urged by Canadian producers (Grey, 1973; and Viner, 
Modelled on the Canadian statute: the United States’ Antidumping Act of 
1921 was a critical development in United States’ law and, because of later 
United States influence, also in GATT law. The 1921 Act signalled a significant 
shift in United States’ anti-dumping policy. The first United States’ anti- 
dumping law, enacted in 1916,s was an antitrust law extending to foreign 
commerce the anti-price discrimination provisions of the 1914 Clayton Act.6 The 
1916 law focused on predatory behaviour by requiring that the dumping be done 
‘commonly and systematically’ at a price ‘substantially less’ than the home 
market price and ‘with the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the 
United States.. . or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade or 
commerce. . . .’7 The 1916 Act provided for criminal penalties and treble 
damages relief, hallmarks of the domestic antitrust laws. 
The 1921 Act introduced into United States’ law the basic confusion of anti- 
trust and protectionist purposes that has marked anti-dumping policy in modem 
times. As with all anti-dumping law, the 1921 Act was consistently justified as 
combatting an unfair practice, namely predatory dumping. The arguments never 
adequately explained, however, why the 1916 Act or the domestic antitrust laws 
were not sufficient for that task - or at least why the predatory pricing concept 
in these laws did not remain the touchstone of anti-dumping law. 
1923, pp. 192-93). 
An Act To Amend the Customs Tariff, 1897, 4 Edw. 7, ch. 11, 9 19 (Can. 1904); see J. Viner, 
Dumping: A Problem in International Trade (1 923 and reprint 1966) [hereinafter ‘Viner, Book’] 
See H. R. Rep. No. I ,  67th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1921). The US Tariff Commission conducted a 
study of both the United States Antidumping Act of 1916 and Canada’s anti-dumping law. The 
report favoured enacting a new law following the Canadian approach. See US Tariff Commission, 
Dumping and Unfair Foreign Competition 30-34 (1 9 19). 
‘Revenue Act of 1916. ch. 463, 5 801,39 Stat. 756,798 (codified at 15 USC Q 72 (1982)). 
Indus. Co., 494 F.Supp. 1190, 1213-23 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discussing the origin of the 1916 Act). 
’ 15USC§72(1982). 
192-204. 
Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. 
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Instead, the operative language of the 1921 Act assailed any dumping that 
injured domestic producers, not just predatory dumping. If one speculates that 
Congress may have considered injurious dumping, even if non-predatory, to be 
unfair, one must ask why Congress did not think the same about domestic price 
discrimination. The 1914 Clayton Act, both before and after the 1936 Robinson- 
Patman Act amendments,s employed only an injury to competition standard. The 
most plausible conclusion is that the 1921 Act was confused and ambiguous and 
could be made to serve either antitrust or safeguard ends. 
The legislative history of the 1921 Act mirrors this same confusion. In the 
Congressional reports and floor debates one can find those who thought 
predatory dumping was the only evil to be remedied.' But there were also those 
who spoke for and understood that some of the chief features of the 1921 Act - 
namely, converting to a duty remedy, dropping the required proof of predatory 
intent, and substituting a mere 'injury to industry' test - added significant 
protectionist potential.'" 
Some tried to argue that the 1921 Act was needed because the 1916 Act was 
ineffective, pointing to the absence of prosecutions under it." But the 
nonexistence or extreme rarity of predatory behaviour could also explain the 
absence of prosecutions. Although the 1916 Act has remained on the books with 
an attractive lure - treble damages - and modem notions of court jurisdiction 
and the antitrust law's reach would pose no problems, only one serious private 
suit, brought in 1970, has been filed under the 1916 Act for predatory 
dumping." Moreover, that case was ultimately dismissed on summary judgment 
* Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat 730 (1914) amended by Robinson-Patman Price 
Discrimination Act, ch. 592, Sec. 1,49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 USC Sec. 13(a) (1982)). 
'See H. R. Rep. No. 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1921) (stating that the legislation will protect 
'our industries and labor against a now common species of commercial warfare of dumping goods 
on our markets at less than cost or home value if necessary until our industries are destroyed.'). 
See also 61 Cong. Rec. 1292 (1921) (Statement of Sen. New). 
'" The previous Congress passed the same bill that later became the 1921 Act, but outgoing 
President Wilson vetoed it. The minority report of the Senate Finance Committee denounced the 
bill as not designed to counter predatory dumping, but to 'suppress importations.' S. Rept. 510 pt. 
2, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2-3 (1920). See also 61 Cong. Rec. 328 (1921) (Statement of Rep. 
Green); 61 Cong. Rec. 339 (1921) (Statement of Rep. Madden); 61 Cong. Rec. 283 (1921) 
(Statement of Rep. Mondell). 
' I  US Tariff Commission, supra note 5, at 18,33. 
See Zenith Radio COT. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F.Supp. 251 (ED Pa. 1975) (holding 
1916 Act not void for vagueness), 494 FSupp. 251 (ED Pa. 1980) (granting defendants' summary 
judgment motion), rev'd sub nom. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Lit., 723 F.2d 319 
(3rd Cir, 1983), improperly before the court during argument on parallel case Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 US 574, 579 n.3 (1985). There was apparently one prior 
civil suit filed in 1931 under the 1916 Antidumping Act, but it never reached the merits. See H. 
Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2nd 666 (2nd Cir. 1935). See also Zenith Radio Cow. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F.Supp. 1190, 1211-1212 (ED Pa. 1980) (noting that the Mali 
case was the only civil suit under the 1916 Act brought prior to 1970 and that there were only four 
criminal actions, none of which yielded a reported decision). 
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because the plaintiffs did not offer to prove facts that would support a plausible 
theory of predatory behaviour.” 
Despite the protectionist potential of statutes like the 1921 Act, increased anti- 
dumping activity did not occur immediately. In a 1927 study for the League of 
Nations, Trendelenburg reported that although a few other countries had enacted 
anti-dumping laws, only Canada, Australia, and South Africa actually took any 
effective action against d ~ m p i n g . ’ ~  The next important step in anti-dumping 
history occurred with the creation of GATT. 
c. Origins of GATT Article V1 
At the formative conferences for the GATT between 1946 and 1947 it seems 
that the drafting countriesI5 readily reached general agreement on the need for 
anti-dumping law, essentially along the lines proposed in the United States’ 
working document: a ‘Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization 
of the United Nations.’Ih The anti-dumping provisions in that document followed 
very closely the 1921 Act. There was concern with possible ‘abuse’ of anti- 
dumping laws. But abuse was thought of in ways similar to abuse of a safeguard 
law - too frequent resort to duties in the absence of real price discrimination or 
import-caused material injury. Thus, the negotiators focused on defining price 
discrimination; on limiting the anti-dumping duty to the margin of dumping; and 
on guaranteeing that the dumped imports were causing ‘material injury’ (Brown, 
1950, p. 110 and 213; and Jackson, 1969, p. 404). 
The negotiators seemed generally unaware of, or uninterested in, anti- 
dumping law’s potential to function like a selective safeguard law having 
nothing to do with real predation. The conference participants would not have 
been alerted to this central issue through a study of Viner, then the leading 
‘ I  The plaintiffs grounded their predatory pricing claim on several domestic antitrust statutes in 
addition to the 1916 Antidumping Act: 5 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 9 2(a) of the Robinson- 
Patman Act, and § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. Technically the District Court dismissed the 1916 
Act claim because the defendants’ products sold at home were not comparable to those sold for US 
consumption. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F.Supp. 1 190 (ED Pa. 1980). 
The Court of Appeals’ reversal of that decision in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Lit., 
723 F.2nd 319 (3rd Cir. 1983), was not actually contested in the petition for Supreme Court 
review. See Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 US 574, 579 n.3 (1986). 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s approval of summary judgment on the domestic claims also 
applied to the 1916 Act claim because the latter rested on a predatory pricing theory. 
l 4  See Trendelenburg (1927) at 7. 
I s  The following nations attended the meeting of the Preparatory Committee: Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States. OfSicial Report of the United 
States Delegation to the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the International 
Conference of Trade and Employment 1 (Oct. 15, 1946). 
l 6  Dept. of State Pub. No. 2598, Commercial Policy Series 93 (1946). 
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dumping scholar,” or the prior League of Nations’ studies devoted to the 
dumping problem. Viner considered the 1921 United States’ Act a model law’* 
and never seemed to appreciate the critical confusion of antitrust and safeguard 
purposes in the act. 
d. Anti-dumping Codes of 1967 and I979 
(1) The 1967 Code. In the Kennedy Round GATT negotiations from 1963- 
1967, anti-dumping laws themselves were put on the negotiating table as 
potential non-tariff barriers to trade. The negotiators were concerned with three 
general problems: (1) the lack of an injury test in the Canadian law; (2) the 
potential for abuse through weak tests of the substantive anti-dumping concepts 
(e.g. material injury, industry, and causation); and (3) the potential for abuse 
through administrative-procedural delays, uncertainties, and arbitrariness. 
European countries particularly associated the risk of delays and harassing 
procedures with the United States’ system (Dam, 1970, pp. 174 and 176; and 
Kelly, 1967, pp. 298-299); whereas the United States complained about the 
potential for arbitrariness in the more discretionary, less rule-governed character 
of the European laws (Kelly, 1967, p. 300). No one argued for an injury-to- 
competition test to return anti-dumping law to its original anti-predation 
purposes. 
The Canadian problem was resolved in the Kennedy Round through Canada’s 
adherence to the Anti-dumping Code and amendment of its domestic law to add 
an injury test (Grey, 1973, pp. 8-9). The other two problems required elaborate 
Code provisions guaranteeing notice and procedural fairness and setting out 
rules and standards for deciding price discrimination, material injury, and 
causation. 
The 1967 Code was fully implemented, at least formally, only in Europe, 
where the new EEC anti-dumping regulation of 1968 conformed faithfully to the 
Code 1ang~age.I~ n the United States an executive-legislative dispute crippled 
the Code. The executive branch sought to implement the Code through 
administrative interpretation of the 192 1 Antidumping Act without asking 
l 7  Viner’s work on dumping includes: J. Viner, Book, supra note 3; Viner, Article on ‘Dumping’ 
in The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences reprinted in J. Viner, Book, supra note 3 [hereinafter 
Viner, Dumping Article]: Viner, ‘A Memorandum on Dumping’ for the League of Nations (1926) 
reprinted in J. Viner, Book, supra note 3 [hereinafter Viner, Dumping Memorandum]. 
IX Viner described the United States’ anti-dumping law of 1921 as ‘a model of draftsmanship.’ 
Viner, Book, supra note 3, at 262. 
I y  Reglement (CEE) No. 459/68 du Conseil, Journal Officiel Des Communautes Europeennes, 
April 17, 1968, at 1 .  The regulation covers dumping from non-EEC countries into the community 
area, and should not be confused with the regulation of intra-EEC dumping. For a discussion of the 
EEC regulation of third country dumping, see Beseler, ‘EEC Protecfion Against Dumping and 
Market Subsidies from Third Countries,’ 6 Common Market Law Review, 327 (1969). 
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Congress for implementing legislation. Urged on by protectionist opponents of 
the Code, Congress balked and passed a 1968 law instructing the United States 
Tariff Commission, the regulatory agency with authority for anti-dumping injury 
questions,?O to consider itself bound only by the 1921 Act. Although the 1968 
law did not technically prevent the Tariff Commission from interpreting certain 
broad Act language to conform to the narrower Code requirements, in practice 
the Tariff Commission applied substantive injury and causality standards at 
variance with the Code and repeatedly found injury based on very weak tests.21 
(2) The 1979 Code. In the Tokyo Round GATT negotiations, from 1974- 
1979, the parties agreed to a new Anti-dumping Code22 that reproduced most of 
the 1967 Code’s provisions with a few amendments, The most important change 
was a weakening of the Code’s causality standard by dropping the prior Article 3 
‘principal cause’ formula and substituting a simple ‘causing’ test. A second 
change expunged the one specific example of antitrust thinking that had found 
its way into the 1967 Code. The earlier Code required anti-dumping officials to 
investigate the presence of ‘restrictive business practices’ in the local industry. 
This presumably meant no injury should be found if domestic oligopolists held 
prices artificially high.23 The 1979 Code dropped all reference to ‘restrictive 
business practices.’ It listed instead a group of injury indicators (decline in 
output, sales, market share, profits, and so on) that one would find in any 
safeguard law. 
It seems that the EEC and the United States wanted these Code changes not 
because of increased predatory, or even ordinary, dumping, but because the 
changes meant they could take safeguard-type action against selective countries 
during a recession. The EEC, in particular, urged a weaker causation test because 
the stronger test had prevented it from awarding anti-dumping relief to cushion 
2” Now called the International Trade Commission. 
*’ For example, the majority of the Tariff Commission wrote in Whole Dried Eggs From Holland 
that as opposed to the material injury test of the 1967 Code ‘a showing of anything more than a 
trivial or inconsequential effect on the domestic industry’ was sufficient to trigger anti-dumping 
duties. 35 Fed. Reg. 12500, 12501 (Tariff Commission 1970). The Tariff Commission also 
rejected the principal cause language of the Code and accepted a very weak test based on the 
injury being ‘attributable in part’ to the alleged dumping. Ferrite Cores From Japan 36 Fed. Reg. 
1934 (Tariff Commission 1971). 
*’ Agreement on Implementation of Article V1 of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, 
GATT Doc. MTN/NTM/W/232 [hereinafter Tokyo Round Texts], reprinted in President’s 
Message to Congress Transmitting the Texts of the Trade Agreements Reached in the Tokyo 
Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, HR Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 257, 31 1 
(1 979). 
23 Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Art. 3(b), June 30, 1967, TIAS No. 6431, (‘The valuation of injury -that is the evaluation of the 
effects of the dumped imports on the industry in question - shall be based on examination of all 
factors having a bearing on the state of the industry in question, such as: . . . market share . . . 
prices . . . and restrictive trade practices.’) 
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the effects of the 1977-78 oil price recession.24 Without a principal cause test, 
anti-dumping relief would be available even if a non-dumping factor, like a 
recession, were the dominant cause of business injury. 
In the years since adoption of the 1979 Anti-dumping Code the principal users 
of anti-dumping remedies have been the United States, Canada, the EEC, and 
Australia.25 Japan has not had an active anti-dumping program, but it may have 
accepted the 1979 Code’s weakened injury standards because of a potential 
future need for anti-dumping protection (Jackson, Louis and Matsushita, 1984). 
The law being applied in this area no longer has anything to do with antitrust 
notions. It is an alternate safeguard law, triggered by price discrimination per se, 
based on weakened injury standards, and applied on a selective basis. 
3. GATT AND NATIONAL ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW 
a. Analytic Framework: Unfairness and Public GoodsZ6 
The unfairness concept motivating anti-subsidy policy may have resembled 
originally, as we shall see, the anti-predation motive of anti-dumping policy. The 
earliest countervailing duty laws were responses to foreign export bounties that 
were thought of as aggressive, potentially predatory actions. Today in GATT 
law, however, countervailing duties may offset domestic subsidies granted 
entirely for internal economic or social ends. The unfairness concept in this 
context is more attenuated. 
Anti-subsidy policy often skates over a number of difficult theoretical issues. 
Anti-subsidy policy abhors government interference in the market and generally 
considers only market outcomes to be fair. Yet according to the theory of market 
failure, ‘public goods’ - those consumed in a sense by society as a whole - 
will be under-supplied if one relies exclusively on the private market. Indeed, the 
very raison d’2tre of government is to supply public goods (including services), 
24 See J. Beseler and A. Williams, supra note 2, at 13-14. Beseler and Williams note that despite 
the tough injury standards, EEC resort to anti-dumping remedies rose dramatically after the 1977- 
78 recession. Id. at 13 and n.76. 
25 The GATT Committee on Anti-dumping practices has reported figures from which it appears 
that between July 1980 and June 1989, Australia had initiated 26 per cent; Canada, 21 per cent; the 
EEC, 20 per cent; and the US, 28 per cent of all anti-dumping actions. All other countries 
combined initiated only five per cent of all of the reported anti-dumping actions. Contracting 
Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 
70-71 (30th Supp. 1984) [hereinafter BISD]; id. at 289-90 (31st Supp. 1985); id. at 188-90 (32nd 
Supp. 1986); id. at 210-12 (33rd Supp. 1987); id. at 201-03 (34th Supp. 1988); id. at 359-61 (35th 
Supp. 1989); id. at 435-39 (36th Supp. 1990). 
26 See generally, J. Barcel6, ‘The Conceptual Framework for EEC Regulation of State Aids,’ 1986- 
87 Italian Yearbook of International Law 50. 
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such as police and fire fighting protection, national security, a system of laws, 
courts, and magistrates, and so on. These would be under-supplied if only 
market ordering were available. Thus any given subsidy could be corrective of a 
prior market failure, and, rather than abhorrent, supply a needed public good. 
Yet at the same time, governments are not infallible; they may also fail. Any 
given subsidy could actually burden aggregate welfare for the benefit of a well- 
organised, articulate special interest group. Measured by overall societal welfare, 
such a policy would be a ‘mistake’. Whether government has in fact ‘failed’ in 
adopting any particular subsidy would of course be a very complex question. 
This analysis suggests two rationales for anti-subsidy policy: (i) to encourage 
cooperation among subsidising governments (in the private context, ‘collusion’) 
to reduce the cost of public goods and ( i i )  to check or constrain the lobbying 
power of special interests. The collusion rationale posits that governments use 
subsidies to ‘purchase’ local production because of public good byproducts 
stemming from that production - such as, fuller employment, self-sufficiency 
(in agriculture, for example), technological growth, development of depressed or 
underprivileged geographic areas, eased adjustment to international competition, 
and so on. These are goals that are likely to be shared by many governments. 
Simultaneous, unrestrained pursuit of them by all or most governments, 
however, will drive up the subsidy cost dramatically - because subsidised 
foreign imports will supplant local production unless the latter is subsidised 
further. A classic market solution to this problem is available: governments 
could compete with one another and drive up the price (subsidy cost) of 
maintaining local production until only a few governments were willing to pay 
the price. Of course the governments involved- functioning like a group of 
monopsonistic buyers of public goods - could improve their aggregate welfare 
through ‘monopsonistic collusion’ to limit the price (subsidy cost) they would 
pay for local production. The ‘collusion’ would take the form of agreed limits on 
subsidies. 
The second rationale looks to international consensus as a check against the 
internal political process. If governments occasionally are the victims of 
organised lobbying efforts by special interests, they can protect themselves to an 
extent by entering international agreements prohibiting certain kinds of 
inefficient or ‘mistaken’ subsidies. Thus, subjecting subsidy policy to 
international scrutiny can help to avoid ‘senseless’ subsidy policies that burden 
aggregate welfare for the benefit of the organised few. The challenge is to draft 
rules to achieve this that are not hopelessly openended at one extreme or 
slavishly tied to market principles at the other. 
A rational approach to fairness in subsidies thus seems to require as a starting 
point some agreed set of rules and principles governing subsidies. Most of the 
public rhetoric, including the metaphor of the ‘level playing field’, rests on a 
very simplistic view that all government intervention is ‘unfair’ - essentially 
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because it contradicts the market. This view skates over the complexities 
introduced by market failure, public goods, and government failure ideas. 
Government can only take these complexities into account, it seems, through 
government to government negotiation and consensus. if  consensus could be 
achieved, countervailing duties might then play a rational role in disciplining 
violations. But GATT members do not currently share very much common 
ground concerning subsidies. in the absence of consensus, countervailing duties 
applied unilaterally - like anti-dumping duties - look very much like selective 
safeguard actions. 
b. Anti-subsidy Law - Pre-GAlT History 
The first countervailing duty laws were enacted by the United States in 1890 
and Belgium in 1892 and were aimed at offseting bounties paid by Continental 
European countries primarily on the export of sugar, but also on other products, 
such as flour and beverage alcohol (Viner, 1923, pp. 168-69). Viner suggested 
that these bounties on exports were not originally intended to promote exports 
but resulted from complex, clumsy tariff and excise tax laws that yielded 
excessive rebates of taxes and drawbacks of duties - that is, rebates and 
drawbacks greater than the taxes or duties actually paid (Viner, 1923, pp. 90-91 
and 163-66). But other countries emulated the excessive rebate system, either 
out of general rivalry or the desire to maintain export markets. 
The initial 1890 American law imposed a countervailing duty (a fixed amount 
per pound) only on refined sugar coming from countries paying an export 
bounty.27 The Belgian law was more general, applying to any import benefiting 
from an export bounty (Viner, 1923, p. 169). In 1897 Congress completely 
rewrote the countervailing duty statute, applying it to all imports, or rather all 
that were dutiable.28 The law was mandatory. Although the Treasury Secretary 
had to decide the existence and amount of any export bounty - which the 
countervailing duty was exactly to offset - neither the Secretary nor the 
President had any discretion to waive the duty. 
None of the early American countervailing duty statutes contained an injury 
test. The initial 1890 law, applicable only to bountied sugar, operated during a 
period in which the United States was subsidising its own domestic sugar 
p r o d ~ c t i o n . ~ ~  An argument for an injury test would hardly have been compelling, 
because Congress had already decided to assist American sugar producers. Any 
*’ McKinley Tariff of 1890, ch. 1244,26 Stat. 567. 
**TariffActof 1897, g5,ch. 11,30stat. 151. 
l9 J. Viner, Book, supra note 3, at 178 n.1. Interestingly, beet and cane sugar producers in the 
United States and Europe are still receiving subsidies (in the United States through price supports 
and a quota system on imports). See New York Times, June 3, 1988, at A12, col. 3. 
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increase in bounty-fed sugar imports pitted the foreign bounty program against 
the American program. When Congress broadened the law in 1897 to apply to 
all imports, it also restricted it to dutiable imports. This restriction could be seen 
as an implicit injury test, or a presumption of injury, because industries already 
receiving some protection were presumably those sensitive to import 
competition. 
This broadened, generalised 1897 law is the true forerunner of the modem 
American countervailing duty law. There is no evidence that Congress 
broadened the law because it feared bounties would spread to many different 
products. The chief concern was still bountied sugar imports, and the chief 
beneficiary seems to have been the powerful American Sugar Refining 
Company, a sugar trust that controlled perhaps as much as 80 per cent of 
American sugar production.3u Congress may have favoured the generalised 
provisions to disguise the protection it was giving the sugar trust. Protectionist 
sentiment also clearly favoured across-the-board nullification of any foreign 
effort to scale American tariff walls through export bounties3’ The Senate 
debate on the proposed law contains a full range of protectionist (producer 
oriented) and free-trade (consumer oriented) arguments for and against the 
countervailing duty law.32 
In the inter-war years, international attention turned increasingly to threats of 
what was loosely called ‘dumping,’ partly because the expected post-war 
increase in industrial output raised fears of market flooding. The government 
practice of bountying exports was known in this period as ‘bounty dumping’ 
(Trendelenburg, 1927, pp. 6-7). Bounty-countervailing duty laws were then more 
”’ See 30 Cong. Rec. 1694 (1987) (statement of Sen. Lindsay). 30 Cong. Rec. 2203 (1897) 
(statement of Sen. Gray) (‘We all know that this 19 5 of Tariff of 18971 is intended primarily, and 
perhaps exclusively to apply to sugar . . . .’). On the legislative influence of the sugar trust, see 30 
Cong. Rec. 2207 (1897) (statement of Sen. Caffery). Tying the countervailing duty to the amount 
of the foreign bounty - as opposed to the prior fixed amount - apparently had the effect of 
tripling the bounty-countervailing duty on sugar. See 30 Cong. Rec. 2204 (1897) (statement of 
Sen. Gray). 
’I See 30 Cong. Rec. 2224 (1897) (statement of Sen. Caffery). Another motive may have been to 
meet the argument, particularly pressed by Germany, that the American countervailing duty on 
sugar violated the most-favoured-nation clause of existing commercial treaties. See 30 Cong. Rec. 
2203-05, 2218 (1897) (statement of Sen. Gray). 
’? Even those claiming to be free-traders argued that it was the export bounty that violated free 
trade principles, not the countervailing duty. One spokesman distinguished the case of cheap 
foreign labour as a ‘natural’ condition (like climate or soil) that should not be equalized, from the 
‘artificial’ condition created by export bounties, that should be neutralised through countervailing 
duties. See 30 Cong. Rec. 2226 (1 897) (statement of Sen. Caffery). He also argued that foreign 
bounties were ‘destructive’ and had a ‘trade war’ quality to them. Id. at 2226. Some claimed 
bounties on exports were ‘unfair competition.’ See 30 Cong. Rec. 2225 (1897) (statement of Sen. 
Lindsay). Staunch free-traders in opposition to the law did not find the distinction between 
artificial and natural conditions persuasive, emphasising that the consumer benefitted in either case 
from the low-priced imports. See 30 Cong. Rec. 22 18 ( 1  897) (statement of Sen. Gray). 
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prevalent than laws against private-initiated dumping (Trendelenburg, 1927, 
Some of these laws, including the United States’ statute of that time, applied 
to both production and export bounties. The United States’ law had been 
amended in 1922, without any evident discussion in the legislative history, to 
add production bounties to the list of countervailable practices.33 Given the 
potential significance of this change, it is curious that the public record seems 
silent on what motivated it. Production subsidies were known practices of 
course, and as Viner speculated, it must have been a matter of indifference to 
domestic producers whether an ‘artificial’ stimulus to foreign competition came 
from a production or an export bounty (Viner, 1923, p. 170). In any event, in 
1927 Trendelenburg (p. 7) concluded that despite the relatively widespread 
existence of bounty-countervailing duty laws they were rarely used in practice, if 
at all. 
P. 6).  
c .  GATT and Countervailing Duties -Article VI 
The GATT Article VI provisions on countervailing duties closely parallel 
those on anti-dumping duties and have the same origin in the early United States 
proposals and suggested International Trade Organization (ITO) charter. 
Apparently the drafting countries readily agreed to include countervailing along 
with anti-dumping duties in the early drafts that ultimately became GATT 
Article VI, despite the distinct differences between the two regimes. The only 
controversy in the early discussions concerned the need for an injury test in 
countervailing duty law (Brown, 1950, pp. 110- 11). Although, as already 
mentioned, the United States had no such test in its own law, it included one in 
the 1945 Suggested Charter. Use of the Protocol of Provisional Application to 
bring GATT Part I1 (including Article VI) into force, however, had the effect of 
allowing the United States legally to continue to enforce its countervailing duty 
law even though it was inconsistent with GATT.34 
Because of the possibility of abuse, it seems surprising that Article VI 
authorises GATT parties to countervail against domestic as well as export 
subsidies and contains almost no definition of what constitutes a subsidy. The 
GATT refers only to a ‘bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon 
33 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 935. See 61 Cong. Rec. 4196 (1921); House Journal 
67th cong., 1st Sess. 372 (1921) (House voted on the change along with 190 minor amendments en 
masse without debate). The United States countervailed against a production (domestic) subsidy 
for the first time in the 1973 Michelin tire case. X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, 7 Cust. 
B. & Dec. 24,38 Fed. Reg. 1,018 (1973). See note 38 infra. 
34 The Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 
30, 1947,61 Stat. A2051 (1947), 55 UNTS 308 (1950), brought Part I1 of GATT into force subject 
to existing legislation. 
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the manufacture, production or export of any merchandi~e.’~~ GATT’s failure to 
link countervailing duties to the direct regulation of subsidies in Article XVI 
compounds the unboundedness of the Article VI language. An importing 
country may countervail even if the subsidy involved does not violate 
Article XVI.36 Perhaps this passive approach to countervailing duties can be 
explained by the relative infrequency of resort to such laws. In 1958 the 
GATT Secretariat reported that only the United States had separate anti- 
dumping and countervailing duty laws, and only the United States and 
Belgium made any noticeable use of countervailing duties3’ Other countries 
focused on price discrimination in the export sector, whether caused by 
private initiative or government bounties. Moreover, the United States did not 
actually countervail against a domestic subsidy in another country until as late as 
1973.38 Countervailing duties did not receive any serious GATT attention until 
negotiation of the 1979 Tokyo Round Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Code. 
4. GAlT AND SUBSIDIES - ARTICLES XVI AND I11 
Despite GATT’s legal decoupling of countervailing duties and direct 
regulation of subsidies, the two are closely connected. The decoupling was 
presumably a form of compromise. It allowed an importing country to apply its 
own unilateral definition of a subsidy to justify a countervailing duty, while not 
imposing a direct restraint on the subsidising government’s practices. Some 
restraint on subsidies was still necessary, however, because a subsidy can have 
two other trade effects not remediable through countervailing duties: (i) 
reduction of imports into the subsidising country and (ii) displacement of non- 
subsidised exports to a third country. An injured country’s only unilateral 
remedy would be a competing subsidy, but that could be quite expensive. The 
drafters of the International Trade Organization Charter (Havana Charter) and 
GATT thus gave considerable attention to the preferred remedy - direct, 
multilateral controls on the use of subsidies. 
35 GATT, supra note 1, art. VI(3). The GATT does bar countervailing against export rebates of 
‘duties or taxes borne by the like product when [consumed at home] . . .’ Id. Art. VI (4). Ad Art. 
VI also provides that multiple currency practices may constitute a countervailable subsidy. 
36 Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duties, Report of the Group of Experts, 20-21 (l%l). 
37 Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duties, 12, 14 (1958). 
38 X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, TD 73-10, 7 Cust. B. 24, 38 Fed. Reg, 1018 (1973). 
Eugene Rossides, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury who approved the application of the 
countervailing duty law in the Michelin case, see id. at 26, called it a landmark decision. E. 
Rossides, US Import Trade Regulation 248 (1986). Another commentator noted that through 1969 
the Treasury Department had never countervailed against a production subsidy. D. King, 
‘Countervailing Duties - an Old Remedy with New Appeal’, 24 Bus. Law 1179,1181 (1969). 
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The early United States’ proposals and the 1948 final draft of the never-to-be- 
adopted Havana CharteS9 drew two basic distinctions that are still a part of 
GATT - one between domestic and export subsidies and a second between 
primary (agricultural) and non-primary product subsidies. The drafting nations 
viewed export subsidies as particularly pernicious and illegitimate, because they 
were likely to lead to trade wars (presumably because other countries would see 
them as predatory or ‘beggar-thy-neighbour ’ policies). They were also less self- 
limiting, because a given subsidy budget would go much further if applied only 
to exports (Brown, 1950, pp. 117-19 and 214-15). Thus, the draft Charter 
completely prohibited all export subsidies, which it defined as subsidies that 
produced a lowered price on exports.40 The United States argued for more 
lenient treatment of domestic subsidies partly on the ground that they were 
preferable to import duties as a form of protection!’ For domestic subsidies, the 
Havana Charter required nothing more than notification to the IT0 and 
consultation (concerning the possibility of limiting the subsidy) with any 
member country serious 
The second distinction - that between primary and non-primary products - 
was based on political reality, not principle. It came about because the United 
States and other important industrial countries all had elaborate and entrenched 
farm subsidy programs they were unwilling to alter. Under certain complex 
conditions, a country could continue to grant export subsidies on primary 
products - provided, however, that such subsidies were not to be used to obtain 
‘more than an equitable share of world trade in [the relevant] ~ornrnodity.’~~ 
GA’IT Article XVI contains the same two distinctions (i) between export and 
domestic subsidies and (ii) between primary and non-primary product subsidies, 
but its provisions are noticeably weaker than those just described in the Havana 
Charter. This apparently came about largely because the United States’ 
delegation to the GATT drafting sessions considered itself without authority to 
enter any undertakings concerning export subsidies.@ 
39 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, March 24, 1948, [Never in Force], Arts. 
25-28 [hereinafter Havana Charter] reprinted in C. Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade, 262-65 
( 1949). 
41 See Brown (1950, p. 117). For a discussion of why domestic subsidies are more efficient than 
trade sector intervention, see generally, G. Denton and S. O’Cleireacain, Subsidy Issues in 
International Commerce 8 (1972), H. Johnson, ‘Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of 
Domestic Distortion’, in Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payment (Baldwin, et al. eds. 1965) at 
9-10; J. Bhagwati, The Theory and Practice of Commercial Policy: Departures from Unified 
Exchange R a m  14-22 (1965). 
42 Havana Charter, supra note 39, Art. 25; Brown (1950, pp. 215-216). 
43 Havana Charter, supra note 39, Art. 28(1); Brown (1950, pp. 215-216). 
UN Doc. E/PC/T/C.6/46, at 2 (1947) cited in Jackson (1969, p. 370). 
Havana Charter, supra note 39, Art. 26( 1). 
326 JOHN J. BARCELO 
The three basic limits on subsidies in the current GATT Article XVI 
developed in three separate steps (Jackson, 1969, pp. 368-99; and Dam, 1970, 
pp. 132-47). First, the original 1947 version of Article XVI contained only what 
is now Section A requiring countries to notify GATT of any subsidies (export or 
domestic) and to discuss with seriously prejudiced member countries the possi- 
bility of limiting a harmful subsidy. Second, in the 1955 Review Session, after it 
was clear that the Havana Charter would not come into force, Section B of the 
current GATT was added, dealing only with export subsidies. Section B weakly 
constrains such subsidies on primary products to a level that will not give the 
subsidising country ‘more than an equitable share of world export trade in [the 
subsidised] product. . .’45 For non-primary product export subsidies, Section B 
only bars introduction of new subsidies before a specific date (December 31, 
1957), which was subsequently extended. Third, a limited number of countries, 
including all the major developed countries, accepted a special 1960 declaration 
completely prohibiting all non-primary product export subsidies.46 
GATT Article 111, which also bears on subsidies, obligates members not to 
apply internal taxation or regulation discriminatorily against imports. Article I11 
(8) (b) provides, however, that payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic 
producers is not violative of Article 111’s nondiscrimination principle. This 
treatment of course harmonises with Article XVI, which subjects domestic 
subsidies only to the general reporting and consulting requirements. 
These minimal provisions on subsidies and countervailing duties in the 
original GATT remained more or less unchallenged until early in the Tokyo 
Round (1974-79). A key development then was passage in the United States of 
the Trade Act of 1974. That Act altered the United States’ countervailing duty 
law in ways that encouraged its use. From 1959 to 1967 there were no 
outstanding United States’ countervailing duty orders.47 By the end of calendar 
year 1974, there were 30 such orders (Marks and Malmgren, pp. 365-66), and 
the trend increased even more dramatically thereafter.48 
Prior to 1974 the Treasury Department, which then administered the 
countervailing duty law, had apparently followed a practice of deliberately 
delaying politically sensitive cases, such as those challenging agricultural 
imports subsidised under the European Common Agricultural Policy (Marks and 
Malmgren, pp. 358-59). Cases could drag on for years, and the United States Iaw 
at the time did not allow a domestic producer judicial review of adverse 
45 GATT, supra note 1 ,  Art. XVI B(3). 
Tariffs and Trade, Nov. 19,1960,3 UST 2605, TIAS No. 5227,445 UNTS 318. 
47 D. King, supra note 38, at 1179. 
48 Marks and Malmgren, pp. 365-66. Between January 1975 and August 1979 108 Countervailing 
Duty Cases were initiated in the United States. Ehrenhaft, ‘What the Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for US 
Trade Policy’, 1 1  Law & Policy International Business 1361, 1404 (1979). 
See Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI(4) of the General Agreement on 
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Treasury decisions. The 1974 Act changed all this: first, by requiring the 
Treasury to reach a final decision on each countervailing duty case within twelve 
months4’ and second, by providing for judicial review of negative decisions.50 
And although the 1974 Act extended the United States’ law to apply to non- 
dutiable goods (with the addition of an injury test), there was still no injury test 
on dutiable goods. Furthermore, during this period, perhaps in response to 
Congressional pressure, Treasury decided for the first time to countervail against 
a domestic subsidy in a foreign country: Canadian regional subsidies to a 
Michelin tyre plant in Nova S~ot ia .~’  
5. SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CODE OF 1979 
a. Subsidies Code Tracks f and 11 
In the Tokyo Round subsidy-countervailing-duty discussions most of the 
United States’ trading partners sought primarily inclusion of an injury test in the 
United States’ law (Lowenfeld, 1980). The United States for its part wanted 
greater discipline on the use of subsidies. The Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duty Code of 1979 (Subsidies Code) achieved both purposes. What has come to 
be called Track I deals with countervailing duties in much the same way as the 
earlier Anti-dumping Code deals with anti-dumping duties. The provisions 
define substantive concepts (material injury, domestic industry, causation) and 
ensure procedural and administrative openness and fairness.52 But Track I 
strikingly omits any definition of the central concept of ‘subsidy.’ Part I1 of the 
Code, sometimes called Track 11, takes up that issue, but still apparently 
decoupled from Track I. Thus, although Track I requires an injury test, it allows 
an importing country to apply its own unilateral definition of a ‘subsidy.’ At 
least there is nothing in the Code that specifically links the Track I1 subsidy 
definition language to the use of countervailing duties under Track I.53 
49 Trade Act of 1974, Ch. 3, Sec. 303(a) (4), 88 Stat. 2049, 19 USC Sec. 1303(a) (4), repealed by 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I, Sec. 103(b) (l), 93 Stat. 190. The 1979 
Act required that the final determination be made within 160 days of the filing of the complaint 
provision. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, Title I, Sec. 705(a) (l), 93 Stat. 159, 
19 USCA Sec. 1671d(a) (1) (West Supp. 1988). 
50Trade Act of 1974, Ch. 3, Sec. 516(c), 88 Stat. 2052, 19 USC 1516. 
52 Tokyo Round Texts, supra note 22, at 257,261-75. 
53 The United States has generally argued for the decoupled theory stated in the text, whereas the 
European Community has urged that Track I1 definitions should be read into Track I. See Simon, 
‘Can GATT Export Subsidy Standards be ignored by the United States in imposing Countervailing 
Duties,’ 5 Northwestern Journal of International L. Bus. 183 (1983). In view of the prior 
understanding that GATT Article XVI definitions would not be read into GATT Article VI, (see 
supra note 35 and accompanying text), one might expect the Code to be very specific about any 
intended change of this understanding. But the Code contains no such provision. 
See supra note 38. 
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Track I1 of the Code extends and elaborates the GATT Article XVI provisions 
and adds a special dispute settlement mechanism. It maintains Article XVI’s two 
basic distinctions: (i) between export and domestic subsidies and (ii) between 
primary and non-primary product subsidies. Track I1 makes illegal only the use 
of export subsidies on non-primary products. An Annex to the Code contains an 
illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies that derives from the effort of a 
GATT Working Group in 1960 to give more detail and substance to Article 
XVI.54 The Code retains the weak Article XVI constraint on export subsidies for 
primary products, limiting such subsidies to a level that will not give the 
subsidising country ‘more than an equitable share of world export trade’ in the 
It adds, however, more detail on what ‘equitable share’ should mean. 
The Code does not prohibit any domestic subsidy, but recognises that such 
subsidies may cause injury to an industry in another country. The dispute 
settlement procedure allows a country adversely affected by a subsidy, whether 
legal or illegal under Track 11, to bring a complaint to a Committee of 
Signatories, which may authorise  countermeasure^.^^ 
If the Code advances the understanding of ‘unfairness’ at the core of anti- 
subsidy law, it does so only in Track 11. By barring export subsidies on non- 
primary products the Code falls in line with the Havana Charter sentiment that 
such subsidies are pernicious and have a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ character. The 
exception for primary product export subsidies merely continues to reflect the 
political reality of widespread government intervention in agriculture and 
ensures that the topic will remain on future negotiating agendas. 
The common element in the Code’s illustrative list of export subsidies is not 
the dual pricing test of Article XVI, but rather the condition that availability of 
the subsidy turns on export performance. That definition strikes at government 
policies aimed at placing products in foreign markets. Domestic subsidies, by 
contrast, reflect policies of a more internal character not linked to product 
destination - like boosting output in depressed regions, or improving 
employment. 
The Code treats domestic subsidies with straightforward ambivalence. Article 
1 I(  1) acknowledges that legitimate social and economic policy goals underlie 
various domestic subsidy programs (regional assistance; sectoral restructuring; 
maintaining employment; encouraging research; promoting development; 
dispersing industry for anti-congestion and environmental  reason^).^' At the 
same time, Article ll(2) urges the parties to ‘seek to avoid causing [certain 
54 Tokyo Round Texts, supra note 22, at 278, 295. For the earlier GATT effort, see BISD, supra 
note 25, at 32-35, 184-201 (9th Supp. 1961). 
55 Tokyo Round Texts, supra note 22, Art. 10, at 278-79. 
56 Id. Art. l8(9), at 291. 
57 Id. Art 1 1 (l),  at 279. 
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effects] through the use of subsidies.’ The effects to be avoided are listed as 
‘injury to a domestic industry of another signatory or serious prejudice to the 
interests of another signatory or . . . [nullification or impairment of] benefits 
accruing to another signatory under the General Agreement, in particular where 
such subsidies would adversely affect the conditions of normal competition.’58 
This last language implies the existence of criteria for evaluating domestic 
subsidies, but the Code leaves them unarticulated. What does ‘adversely affect 
the conditions of normal competition’ mean in this context? Until such criteria 
are elaborated - either in a subsequent negotiating round or through ad hoc 
decisions under the dispute settlement procedure - the Code test will probably 
take on a safeguard-like quality. That would mean that generally no domestic 
subsidy should cause material business injury to an industry in another country 
(either through increased imports into or decreased exports from the adversely 
affected country). 
The Code’s treatment of countervailing duties similarly resembles a safeguard 
approach. Under Track I an importing country is free to impose countervailing 
duties against any domestic or export subsidy that causes material injury to one 
of its domestic industries. Thus, the Track I concept of ‘unfairness’ is not 
particularised as to the nature, amount, or circumstances of the subsidy and 
seems implicitly to conflict with Track 11’s acceptance of domestic subsidies for 
certain social and economic goals. In this posture without guidance from a 
strong or clear concept of unfairness, countervailing duties, like anti-dumping 
duties, seem aimed primarily at shielding domestic production from import 
competition. 
For a different conclusion about countervailing duties, particularly when used 
against domestic subsidies, one must find inherent Unfairness in a subsidising 
government’s pursuit of legitimate domestic goals - at least when the subsidy 
policy takes sales away from producers in a foreign market. Such an ‘unfairness’ 
argument could only rest upon a notion of ‘market infallibility,’ because it 
stigmatises all market corrective government actions. This was apparently 
the position of the United States delegation in the Tokyo Round; whereas 
the EEC took the view (reflected in the Track IIprovisions on the legitimacy 
of certain domestic subsidies) that many domestic subsidies are entirely 
legitimate and should be countervailed only if they represent disguised export 
s~bs id i e s .~~  Given that this domestic subsidy issue and the problem of 
agricultural subsidies remain unresolved, it is not surprising that the subsidies 
issue has been placed on the negotiating agenda for the current Uruguay Round 
of GATT negotiations. 
58 Id. Art. 11(2), at 280 (emphasis added). 
59 J. Beseler and A. Williams, supra note 2, at 15-17. 
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b. Implementation in National Law 
Although the leading parties to the Tokyo Round Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duty Code faithfully conformed legislation on the books to the 
Code’s requirements, the United States has in fact been the only major industrial 
country in recent years to have an active countervailing duty program. From 
mid-1982 to mid-1989, for example, only seven countries (or customs 
territories) reported use of countervailing duty laws to the Subsidies Code 
Committee of Signatories: Australia, Canada, Chile, the EEC, Japan, New 
Zealand, and the United States. Of the 314 countervailing duty investigations 
initiated by all countries (or customs territories) in that period, 85 per cent were 
initiated by either the United States or Chile.60 The United States alone initiated 
61 per cent or 192 investigations. Japan initiated only one. 
5. UNFAIR TRADE REMEDY LAW AND REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
a. US-Canada Free Trade Agreement 
In contrast to GATT, one finds a strikingly different approach to unfair trade 
remedy law in regional arrangements like the recently formed US-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement and the European Economic Community. The US-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement, which both the United States and Canada have now 
implemented,6’ contains implicit sentiment in favour of reducing or eliminating 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty remedies. In view of Canada’s role as the 
historical originator of anti-dumping law, it is ironic that Canada is the chief 
proponent of this view. Although Canada and the United States are each the 
others most significant trading partner, bilateral trade is a much higher 
proportion of Canadian than of United States’ GNP. Thus, United States’ unfair 
trade remedy action against Canadian goods has a greater effect on Canadian 
internal affairs than the reverse pattern has on United States’ affairs. 
The US-Canada Free Trade Agreement provides that over a five to seven year 
period the two parties will seek to negotiate a new regime for anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties, and subsidies.62 According to the Canadian government: 
‘The goal of any new regime . . . will be to obviate the need for border remedies, 
as are now sanctioned by the GATT Antidumping and Subsidies Codes, for 
example, by developing new rules on subsidy practices and relying on domestic 
60 BISD, supra note 25, at 44-45 (30th Supp. 1984); id. at 264-65 (31st Supp. 1985); id. at 165-66 
(32nd Supp. 1986); id. at 204-05 (33rd Supp. 1987); id. at 191-92 (34th Supp. 1988); id. at 384 
(35th Supp. 1989); id. at 451-56 (36th Supp. 1990). 
See United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 
449, 102 STAT. 1851 (1988) (US implementing act); SC 1988 c.  65 (Canadian implementing act). 
Free Trade Agreement, initialled Dec. 10, 1987, Canada - United States, Department of 
External Affairs, Canada Dec. 10 1987, arts 1906-07, at 279. 
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competition law.’63 It seems that Canada would like to see anti-dumping policy 
return to its original antitrust purposes in bilateral trade and believes that 
existing national antitrust law is adequate to this end.@ Canada also seems to 
favour replacing countervailing duty laws with agreed bilateral limits on 
subsidies. If such an agreement could be reached and were faithfully observed, 
countervailing duty laws would be redundant. 
The current agreement takes only a modest step toward the Canadian goal. It 
sets up a series of binational panels to serve as final review boards for the 
respective national agencies that make anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
decisions.65 While the panels are instructed to apply the respective nation’s 
domestic law and standard of review, the device of intense international (or at 
least binational) surveillance of these decisions could be very useful in future 
agreements. 
b. European Economic Community 
These developments in the US-Canada free trade context appear to follow 
haltingly the regime applied internally within the European Economic 
Community. During the EEC’s formative ‘transition period’ the Commission 
could authorise a member state to take countermeasures against dumping from 
another member state.66 Now that the transition period has expired (as of 
December 3 1, 1969), anti-dumping countermeasures are no longer permissible 
for intra-EEC trade.67 The EEC treaty clearly contemplates that any dumping 
practices surviving the elimination of internal trade barriers will be dealt with 
under the Community antitrust rules and procedures.6R 
Countervailing duties, on the other hand, were never authorised within the 
EEC. Instead, from the outset the EEC treaty sought direct regulation 
(prohibition) of impermissible subsidy practices through treaty rules applied and 
elaborated in practice by the Council, the Commission, and the Court of 
Justice.69 The emerging regime is considerably more discriminating than the 
63 Id .  Explanatory note to chapter nineteen, at 268. 
Anti-Dumping Law: Repeal it or Revise it’, I Mich. YB International Legal Srud., 53 (1979). 
65 Free Trade Agreement supra note 62, arts. 1901-191 1 .  
66 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 1957, Art. 
91(1), 298 UNTS 1 1  [hereinafter Treaty of Rome); 3 H. Smit & P. Herzog, The Law of the 
European Economic Community 3-374.1 (1986). 
67 .I. Beseler and A. Williams, supra note 2, at 32-33. 
See generally Treaty of Rome, Arts. 85 & 86 (Art. 85(1) (d) forbidding agreements that distort 
competition through applying ‘dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions’ and Art. %(a) 
forbidding abuses such as ‘unfair purchase or selling prices.’). See also J.  Beseler and A. Williams, 
supra note 2, at 33; 2 H. Smit and P. Herzog, supra note 89, at 3-231,3-269,3-270. 
6q Treaty of Rome, Arts. 92-94; J.  Beseler & A. Williams, supra note 2, at 33. 
For a discussion of the adequacy of the antitrust laws to deal with dumping see J. Barcelo, ‘The 
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GATT system in its treatment of various subsidies, but one can detect among 
officials in the central regulatory institution, the Commission, a distinctly pro- 
market suspicion of most member government subsidies. This may reflect a 
Commission view that government failure is a larger problem in the subsidy 
field than market failure. Or it may reveal a Commission fear that greater 
toleration of member government subsidies would lead to burdensome and 
wasteful runaway competition in subsidies. The significant point, however, is 
that the EEC institutions are steadily improving and refining their understanding 
of what is fair or unfair about particular subsidies.70 That task lies ahead for both 
the US-Canada free trade area and the GATT. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The lesson here seems to be that as nations strive for a more integrated trading 
area they become less willing to tolerate safeguard-like use of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty laws. They resort instead to general antitrust law to deal with 
predatory price cutting and seek mutually beneficial consensus on the use of 
subsidies. If this perception is accurate, one can expect this approach eventually 
to spread to the GATT level; perhaps not as soon as the Uruguay Round,7n but 
eventually. 
The current vigour of GATT unfair trade remedy law does not seem tied to 
coherent notions of unfairness concerning international price discrimination or 
subsidies. That is at least one basis for the prediction in the previous paragraph 
that these laws will eventually be altered or replaced if the GATT countries 
continue to evolve toward greater economic integration. Anti-dumping laws 
grew up originally out of unfounded fears of predatory dumping but now 
function like quasi-safeguard laws. Countervailing duty laws also arose 
originally out of fears of predatory ‘bounty dumping’ and have grown, 
particularly in the United States, into laws combatting indiscriminately most 
forms of government intervention in the market. As ordinary trade barriers have 
come down through GATT negotiations, producers have clearly turned 
increasingly to unfair-trade-remedy law for protection. The rationale that GATT 
As of this writing, the Uruguay Round negotiations are still in progress. The author has seen 
drafts of working proposals for GATT anti-subsidy and anti-dumping law as of late 1990. The 
anti-subsidy proposals advance significantly in the direction predicted and advocated in this 
article: tying countervailing duty action to agreed regulation of subsidies and a definition of 
‘actionable subsidies’ that seems to allow domestic subsidies within agreed standards or limits: for 
example, to aid an economically depressed geographic region or to assist a restructuring of output 
away from declining industries. The anti-dumping proposals, however, are not as progressive. 
They still concentrate on avoiding abuse of procedures or substantive concepts that retain a 
safeguard-like character. They do not advance toward an antitrust understanding of anti-dumping 
policy. 
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countries need these remedies to combat unfair practices seems unconvincing 
and unlikely to last. 
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